Cavalry training of past centuries. The advent of firearms. From Donbass to Lviv

The art of training horses

(the article does not match the video and photo, but it is very interesting to learn about the preparation of horses of an earlier time)

In all historical periods, the primary task of cavalry commanders was to correctly select and prepare the horses needed for a certain kind of battle. The same problems existed in the era of the Napoleonic Wars.

For heavy cavalry, large, broad-boned horses were bought; perhaps somewhat slow, but able to easily support the weight of the cuirassiers with all their ammunition and weapons. These horses had to move well at a trot, be less sensitive to leg movements, and be ridden for action in close formation. The growth of cuirassier horses ranged from 151 to 160 or more cm.

In Russian measures of length of that time, this ranged from 2 arshins 2 inches to 2 arshins 4 inches.

Heavily armed cavalry did not have to be skilled riders. Participation in individual fights, as a rule, was not part of their task. Practically all charters of the European armies provided for a loose attack in cuirassier regiments only in the event of the pursuit of an overturned enemy or a raid on an artillery battery; under any other circumstances, the attack was carried out in close formation.

Light cavalry was supplied with less tall horses. In Russia, their height was determined from 2 arshins to 2 arshins 2 inches, in England 145-150 cm. These should have been more frisky, nimble horses, obedient and intelligent, able to make sharp turns, stop at a gallop and start off at a gallop.

Accordingly, higher demands were made on the riders. They had to skillfully manage their horse and control its actions. The main weapon of a hussar or lancer in a battle against a cuirassier should have been the speed and skill of the rider.

Nadezhda Durova describes one curious incident that happened to her during an exercise while serving in the Mariupol Hussar Regiment. She fell off her horse and although her fault was minimal, the commander's reaction was very negative.

However, in any case, even the light rider of the regular cavalry was inferior in skill to the cavalry of the irregular troops. Therefore, in all parts of the European regular cavalry, they were forced to pay attention to the closed method of battle, because only in this way it was possible to defend themselves against natural cavalry.

As a rule, a well-trained horse, even having lost its rider, continued to gallop forward together with everyone and ram the enemy’s formation. Nolan cites one curious fact from military history on this occasion:

“In the battle of Strigau, a horse without a rider, with a hind leg torn off by a shot, joined the squadron, and despite the fact that we scattered several times, it remained in the ranks throughout the entire battle. On collection, she constantly returned to the very place that she occupied while still under the saddle.

For the most part, enemy fire was directed precisely at the horses, since only in this way could the avalanche of cavalrymen rushing at full speed be stopped.

These reasons explained the large loss of horses in the regiments during the battles. Often the loss of animals exceeded the loss of personnel. For example, at Borodino, the Life Guards Cavalry Guard Regiment lost 135 horses for 104 killed and wounded soldiers and officers.

The rider, left without a horse, did not pose a particular danger and was forced to go to the rear if it was not possible to catch a free horse in order to continue participating in the battle on it.

War horses were certainly taught in advance to the noise of shots and explosions. This was done in a variety of ways. One of them suggested, for example, N. Osipov:

"G. De la Brou says that the easiest and most convenient way to accustom the horses in a short time to the noise of weapons and shooting is to shoot the stable with a pistol and beat the drum once a day; and especially before the task of oats; from which they will listen to this noise and knock willingly, and will soon get used to it.

“You can train a horse to fire in another way. In advance, give them a gun to see and sniff; then, without loading it, pull the trigger in front of them in order to accustom them to the knock of the trigger and the shelf, when they get used to this knock, then at a distance from the horse make a flash several times from the shelf; then come closer to her, so that she gets used to and gets acquainted with the smell of gunpowder and smoke. After that, shoot with the smallest charge, first at a distance, and then from an hour closer, and finally while sitting on it. Every time you have to go up to her, caress her and give her some oats or some other bait. With exactly the same patience, teach her to drumming, sword and saber knocking and other military cries.

A necessary part of the training of a war horse was its preparation for forcing water obstacles. Not all breeds of horses swim equally well, and these nuances were also taken into account by repairmen who purchase horses for the army.

“In Finland, in Poland and on the banks of the Volga, horses swim excellently and cross vast expanses of water without any difficulty; in Africa, in Arabia, and in general in those places where there are only small and shallow rivers, which sometimes dry up completely in the summer, horses do not know how to swim at all, and if they even stumble a little, they usually drown. No matter how well the horse swims, but if they want it to swim across as fast as a wide river, then it is necessary, if possible, to free it from burdens and the rider.

If there are no boats at hand for the depot of ammunition, then they are replaced by small rafts made of reeds, reeds or fascines, on which people put clothes, weapons, ammunition, etc., and then, tying them with ropes to their the body, in this form, is dragged from one coast to another. Cavalrymen must cross without any clothing; they must sit astride only those horses that are more skillful in swimming than others, and, finally, manage those horses whose tails are held by the hands of other riders. Tatars and Poles cross the rivers in a similar way. When crossing by swimming, you should never put two cavalrymen on one floating horse.

“When crossing horses, they must swim in separate lines in a direction parallel to the flow of water. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that people look not at the water, but at the opposite bank: otherwise they can be carried away by the current. They must hold on to the mane and control the bridle alone; and so that the horses during swimming cannot be confused with their legs, the reins must be kept high and short.

As for the dressage of horses, it was carried out in different armies in different ways. Perhaps one of the most barbaric methods of preparing young animals for service in the light cavalry was used in Russia, however, this method lasted only until 1812:

“Until 1812, simple techniques were used in our cavalry for repairs. By May 1, the regiments, as a rule, gathered for a 6-week campaign, by the time of which the repair teams drove young horses from the Don, Crimean and Ukrainian shoals to replenish the light cavalry. The horses, of course, were not driven up, almost in a completely wild state, and therefore the hottest thing for the squadron commanders came in the spring: it was necessary to put these savages in the front as soon as possible.

“The usual methods of dressage consisted in putting sandbags, from 5 to 6 pounds in weight, on a wild horse with extreme effort, sometimes knocking it down, and chasing it on a lunge with a heavy capsun to exhaustion. All this was done in order to quickly pacify the savage. After 2 days, they saddled her, rolled the same bags over the saddle and repeated the chase on the lunge.

This was followed by the final dressage, which consisted in the fact that the saddled horse was taken out to the pasture, where the bravest and most powerful rider, armed with a whip, instantly jumped into the saddle and, raising the horse’s head and not letting him come to his senses, began to whip it with a whip and let it go at full speed. supports of complete exhaustion of the horse. Then the rider reduced the volt towards the stable, without ceasing, however, to act with the whip. The horse, having lost its last strength and vigor, switched to a trot and a walk, and the rider dismounted from it no earlier than having dragged himself to the stable. Exactly the same trick was sometimes repeated the next day, already with less resistance from the animal, and this ended the course of dressage: the horse was considered sufficiently arrived and was placed in the front.

Sometimes such a trip ended with the fact that the animal immediately broke to its feet, or toiled and got a fuse, so that in the regiments of that time most of the horses were married ... In addition, many horses were worn, and some were overturned.

When preparing horses for heavy cavalry, a different method of dressage was used, more “humane”, since these horses, as a rule, came from horse factories and were already partially prepared for military service. In addition, they were too expensive for such experiments.

Overdue needs

The first cavalry army of Budyonny was created on November 17, 1919 on the Southern Front of the Civil War. By order, it included three divisions of the first cavalry corps of Budyonny. Subsequently, the army grew and was supplemented by various military formations, until the number of personnel reached nineteen thousand sabers, which was quite a lot by those standards. The Red Army urgently needed to create a powerful, maneuverable unit that would quickly strike and carry out strategic tasks. And then Anton Denikin was rapidly approaching Moscow from the southern lands. On September 7 of the same year, Kursk was taken by the White Guards, on September 23 - Voronezh, four days later - Chernigov, and at the very end of the month - Orel. The commander of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia planned to go to Tula, and from there to the stronghold of the Bolsheviks to Moscow. The Reds were threatened with complete defeat, and therefore, on the initiative of Kliment Voroshilov and Alexander Yegorov, just such an army was born in this theater of operations, capable of crushing Denikin.

Military uniform of Budyonny

Initially, it was assumed that the leader of the First Cavalry Army would be Boris Dumenko, under whose command was Semyon Budyonny. However, then Dumenko was seriously wounded, and therefore his assistant was put in the place of the commander. Subsequently, Dumenko will be shot on charges of murdering his own red commissar, and Budyonny will survive the flywheel of repressions of the thirties intact thanks to his friendship with Joseph Stalin. And before that, both of these people led the aforementioned first cavalry corps, which then became the backbone of an entire army.

Initially, Boris Dumenko was to become the leader of the First Cavalry Army.

Baptism of fire

This first corps also appeared in the active phase of the Civil War as a necessary unit capable of repulsing the White Guards. So, in May 1919, Budyonny's cavalry corps entered into a heavy battle near Tsaritsyn. Then, on May 13, in a bloody battle near the village of Grabbaevskaya, the forces of the Red Cavalry and the Kuban Cavalry Corps clashed. And the Reds emerged victorious from this battle. A few days later, the cavalry corps made a successful maneuver behind enemy lines and managed to forcibly drive the white units across the Manych River.

In May 1919, Budyonny's cavalry corps entered into a heavy battle.

Then Budyonny's cavalry won another number of victories, thanks to which they managed to stabilize the situation on this sector of the front and prevent the White Volunteer Army from seizing the crossings across this river. And even then, the fighting showed how powerful such military formations can be. But ahead was the defense of Tsaritsyn.

Painting by Mitrofan Grekov “Trumpeters of the First Cavalry Army

The first cavalry formations were immediately put into motion on the most important sectors of the front. Through Tsaritsyn, for which fierce battles were fought, the forces of Kolchak and Denikin could unite. In the event of a victory, the Whites would have surrounded the Reds in a tight ring. But the counter-attacks, interspersed with swift attacks, by the Budyonnovists against the Whites in June-July 1919 more than once saved the situation. The Budennovites took hundreds of prisoners, captured enemy carts and warehouses, and destroyed entire divisions. So, the First Cavalry swept away the Khopersky division of General Mamontov, the Astrakhan infantry division and the third and fourth divisions of Pokrovsky. The White Guards tried to resist the red sabers of their cavalry in the form of Cossacks, but they could not provide adequate resistance.

Strikes of the first cavalry army

In October, when Denikin's Volunteer Army stopped briefly, the Reds went on a decisive offensive. Their goals were to push back Denikin beyond Voronezh and crush the White front as part of the Voronezh-Kastornenskaya operation. The shock group of the Red Army included, of course, the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny; he was to lead a general attack on the Don and Kuban corps, defeat them and clear the way for the Red infantry.

The strike group of the Red Army included the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny

This time Budyonny came across the same enemy - General Mamontov, who had already managed to feel the full power of the cavalry army. And now he acted more cautiously: for the whole of October, the Budennovites were forced either to engage in defense, losing the initiative, or to make sorties again. The Whites stubbornly advanced towards Voronezh, occupying important settlements, but from November 5 to 15, the Red cavalrymen delivered a number of unexpected attacks on enemy positions. Soon all the forces of the Whites melted away, and the first cavalry corps was transformed into an army.

Cavalry served to carry out important strategic tasks

Further history

After the Voronezh-Kastorno operation, the First Cavalry took part in the Kharkov winter offensive. And again, the Budennovites delivered the main blows jointly with the 14th Army of the Red Army on the positions of the Whites. During these attacks, it was possible to separate the forces of the Volunteer and Don armies. Later, the Reds managed to oust the Whites from the south of Russia as a result of the Donbass and Rostov-Novocherkassk operations with the help of cavalrymen. Already in January 1920, after the rapid capture of Rostov, the Cavalry drove the Whites to the opposite bank of the Don.

Cavalry served to carry out important strategic tasks

The real test was the Battle of Yegorlyk, which lasted from February 25 to March 2, when Budyonny and his soldiers met with the battle-hardened cavalry of Pavlov, Kutepov and Yuzefovich. It was there that the largest oncoming cavalry battle in the Civil War took place: twenty-five thousand sabers participated in the battle in total. And again, Budyonny emerged victorious from this fight, and the Reds developed success and promptly drove the Whites out of the North Caucasus.

The Yegorlyk battle was a triumph for the First Cavalry Army

The first cavalry came in handy for the Red Army in further hostilities: it entered into battle with the Poles during the Soviet-Polish war, the Makhnovists and the Wrangel troops. Despite numerous victories, the Budennovites staged numerous pogroms of the Jewish population. This was described in detail by Isaac Babel in the Cavalry series of stories, which was sharply criticized by Semyon Budyonny. In general, there are many cases when loyal fighters of the revolution engaged in looting and committed crimes.

The 1st Cavalry Army saved the position of the Bolsheviks

We can say that the 1st Cavalry Army saved the position of the Bolsheviks. Thanks to its swift attacks, it was possible to turn Denikin's Volunteer Army back and generally defeat the Whites on the entire Southern Front. The command of the Reds at the time felt the need to create such a large formation, and even more so immediately let it into battle. The cavalry existed until 1921 and was disbanded.

On February 26, the information portal globalconflict.ru published a message that the second unit of the Russian Armed Forces, which has horses at its disposal, will be the 55th brigade of mountain motorized riflemen of the Central Military District, which is under formation and will be deployed in the city of Kyzyl. Information about this came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov. Previously, only the 34th separate brigade of the Southern Military District used specially trained horses to transport people and goods in mountainous areas. Especially for military needs, horse breeders bred the Tuvan breed of horses, which is distinguished by its special endurance and unpretentiousness (previously, preference was given to horses of the Karachai and Mongolian breeds, as well as Russian trotters).

The decision to create the 55th OMGB was made in 2014, and by November of this year, its formation should be completed. In the near future, a field camp will be set up in the vicinity of Kyzyl and all the necessary conditions will be created so that by the beginning of summer all the personnel of the unit can be accommodated there. About a hundred horses will soon be at the disposal of the new unit, and in June intensive combined arms training of personnel will begin.

The use of horses greatly facilitates the movement of shooters along mountain paths.
sdelanounas.ru

Currently, mountain shooters are being trained in training centers. In particular, the personnel of the brigade have already started the first lessons with horses in the Ergaki training and sports complex, located in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. General Salyukov noted that there is a need to send instructors to the location of the 34th Motorized Brigade in Karachay-Cherkessia to familiarize them with the organization of the work of mounted military units.

Military and border service in mountainous areas takes place in specific conditions, such as the lack of passable roads for wheeled vehicles, large elevation changes and supply difficulties. Therefore, the use of horses as a draft force for the transport of goods and the movement of personnel is often the only option. The use of horse traction requires the organization of proper infrastructure at military units, but leads to significantly lower costs than laying roads in the mountains and maintaining a fleet of wheeled and caterpillar vehicles. At the same time, the carrying capacity of a pack horse is quite high - in some cases, the animal is able to successfully transport up to one hundred kilograms of cargo over a distance of thirty or more kilometers a day.

The use of other animals for military purposes, in particular pack donkeys, was considered inappropriate, and after additional study of the issue by the military departments, this option was rejected. Given that donkeys have a more sensitive nervous system than horses, they are often stubborn and can give away the location of the military with their loud cry. Obviously, the horse is an animal more suitable for military service, but it also requires special training - for example, developing a habit of the sounds of gunfire and explosions.

The training of horses for mountain rifle units involves, in particular, the development in animals of the habit of the sounds of shots.
vpk-news.ru

Today in Russia there are more than fifty breeding plants and more than one hundred and twenty breeding reproducers, where constant work is carried out to reproduce existing horse breeds and breed new ones. The total horse population in the country is about one and a half million individuals, and it is obvious that the military department will not have problems with completing parts with horses.

With the development of technology and weapons, the importance of the horse as a combat unit and vehicle gradually decreased - for example, in the USSR, the cavalry was abolished in the mid-50s. However, as practice shows, it is not advisable to completely write off horses. The current level of development of automatic small arms makes it pointless to revive regular cavalry units in the army, but in the border service, mountain rifle units, and also some rear services, the use of horses is justified. In addition, today there are mounted units in the structure of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, as well as parts of the guard of honor. Even the Russian Airborne Forces have acquired their own stables, having bought sixty Khakass trotters in 2013 for their academy in Ryazan.

Special cavalry units for ceremonial occasions exist in many armies.
eng-molot.com

Currently, cavalry units are preserved in the law enforcement agencies of many countries. For example, the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan have a cavalry battalion of chasseurs, which is part of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the border troops of Belarus have two outposts that use horses to protect the border. In Great Britain, not a single major metropolitan celebration takes place without a parade of the royal cavalry, and in Canada, since 1873, there has been a royal mounted police. As for Russia, only about a thousand people and 255 horses are in the service of the Moscow Mounted Police. In Germany, the 23rd Mining Brigade, located in southern Bavaria, includes the 230th Mining Animal Training Center with 120 draft horses and mules.

British Palace Cavalry returns to barracks after dress rehearsal for parade in London's Hyde Park
theguardian.com

In the US military departments, the high importance of the horse as a draft force is recognized at the present time. Even spending huge sums on the development of the latest transport systems for the army, the Americans are investing in the creation of a "running" robot on four limbs, imitating the movements of a horse or mule. Experts from the Pentagon agree with the obvious fact that in mountainous and wooded areas the effectiveness of wheeled vehicles is low, and therefore the horse will be able to deliver goods faster and much cheaper. At the moment, research and development of walking robots continues.

LS3 AlphaDog - a prototype of a military transport robot from Boston Dynamics (USA)
militaryfactory.com

Heavy Cavalry - CURRAIRS

Cuirassiers were considered the main striking force of the cavalry; in the cuirassier units, the tallest and strongest recruits were selected, who were planted on the tallest and strongest horses. All cuirassiers wore helmets and cuirasses introduced in 1811 - steel armor that protected the back and chest. As a result of all of the above, the mass of such an equestrian fighter was so great that he was able to overturn any enemy - even on foot, even on horseback. No troops could resist the attack of the cuirassiers; that is why the cuirassier was thrown into battle at the most decisive moment of the battle in order to turn the tide of battle in their favor.
In total, by the beginning of the war, Russia had 8 army cuirassier regiments:
His Majesty's Cuirassier Regiment
Her Majesty's Cuirassier Regiment
Cuirassier Military Order Regiment
Little Russian Cuirassier Regiment
Glukhovsky Cuirassier Regiment
Yekaterinoslav Cuirassier Regiment
Astrakhan Cuirassier Regiment
Novgorod cuirassier regiment
In December 1812, the Pskov and Starodubovsky dragoon regiments were reorganized into cuirassier regiments for military merit. Captured French - light and yellow - cuirasses became a special combat distinction of the Pskov cuirassier regiment.
The uniform of all cuirassier units of Russia was the same: white tunics, black helmets and cuirasses with copper trim, high boots; regiments differed from each other only in the color of collars, cuffs and epaulettes. The cuirassiers were armed with a long broadsword and a pair of pistols; the cuirassier guns they had before the war, with the outbreak of hostilities, the cavalrymen handed over to the armament of the militia units. They only had rifled fittings (16 per squadron), too short to be used in infantry combat.


An officer of the Little Russian Cuirassier Regiment in dress uniform and a private of the Astrakhan Cuirassier Regiment in marching uniform

private of the Glukhov cuirassier regiment in winter uniform and private of the Pskov cuirassier regiment (1813) in full dress with a captured French cuirass

Heavy Cavalry - Dragoons

Once upon a time, dragoons were created as "driving infantry" - they were trained to conduct both horse and foot combat. But by the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian dragoon units (unlike the French dragoons) had completely lost their foot combat skills and turned into ordinary cavalry, intermediate between heavy cuirassiers and light hussars. The dragoon units were the most numerous in the Russian cavalry - Russia had 36 dragoon regiments. However, during the fighting, it turned out that with an excess of dragoons, the army did not have enough light cavalrymen, and in December 1812, 16 dragoon regiments were reorganized into light horse regiments, and two were transferred to cuirassiers for merit.
Russian dragoons wore infantry uniforms and leather helmets; regiments differed from each other in the color of buttons, shoulder straps, collars and cuffs. On the legs - white leggings and boots with hard tops; on campaigns, dragoons wore gray long trousers, and under them light boots with soft tops. The dragoons were armed with a pair of pistols, straight broadswords and dragoon rifles, which, after the outbreak of hostilities, were transferred to the armament of the militia units. The dragoons were left with only rifled fittings (16 per squadron), too short to be used in infantry combat.


Private of the Noble Dragoon Squadron in dress uniform and private of the Kharkov Dragoon Regiment in marching uniform

An officer of the Irkutsk Dragoon Regiment in marching uniform and a private of the Orenburg Dragoon Regiment in winter uniform

Light Cavalry - HUSSARs

Hussars are a kind of light cavalry that appeared in Russia in the 18th century. At first, the hussar regiments were irregular, they were recruited from the natives of Bulgaria, Hungary, the Danubian principalities, Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia. Since 1741, the hussars were included in the regular Russian cavalry and made up its lightest, most mobile part.
The hussars were primarily responsible for outpost, guard service and reconnaissance of enemy forces. On a campaign, they invariably marched in the vanguard or rearguard, hiding the movement of the army. The hussars were indispensable in partisan detachments operating on enemy communications, tireless in pursuing his retreating troops. In case of failure, they covered the retirade of their own army. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army consisted of 11 army hussar regiments:
Alexandria Hussars
Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment
Belarusian hussar regiment
Grodno Hussar Regiment
Elizavetgrad Hussar Regiment
Izyum Hussar Regiment
Lubny Hussar Regiment
Mariupol Hussar Regiment
Olvipol Hussar Regiment
Pavlograd Hussar Regiment
Sumy Hussar Regiment
In December 1812, the Irkutsk Dragoon Regiment was reorganized into a hussar regiment.
The uniform of the Russian hussars was traditional for this type of troops - it imitated the national Hungarian costume. The hussars dressed in a short woolen jacket embroidered with cords - a dolman, tight chakchira trousers and a mentik - a short warm jacket trimmed with fur. A special cord clasp - a menticket held the mentic on the left shoulder. In the cold season, the mentic was worn in sleeves. The collar and cuffs of the uniform of non-commissioned officers and headquarters trumpeters were sheathed with gold or silver galloon (according to the color of the metal device). Trumpeters' dolman and mentic were distinguished by shoulder "shells" made of yellow or white woolen braid, as well as laid out shoulder and sleeve seams. Previously, the privates' cloaks were turned off with a white sheepskin coat, and the non-commissioned officers' cloaks were black. But with the introduction of black fur instead of white in a number of hussar regiments, this distinction was no longer respected. The shelves differed from each other in different color combinations of all elements of the form.
Chakchirs relied on short boots with hard tops and spurs. In the campaign, the hussars put on gray cloth leggings over the chakchira, trimmed on the inside with black leather leys. With hiking leggings, they usually wore low boots with soft tops. The hussar attire was completed by a belt made of thin garus laces, with gomba interceptions, decorated with two tassels. In bad weather, the hussars wore wide cloaks of gray overcoat with standing collars. A characteristic special element of the hussar uniform was a tashka - a flat bag with long straps that descended below the knees.
The headdress of the hussars was a shako of the 1812 model made of black cloth trimmed with leather. The shako was decorated with a black ribbon cockade, a rosette with an orange border and a metal buttonhole with a button (according to the color of the device). A wooden burdock, covered with white or yellow cloth, was attached on top. The decoration of the hussar shako was complemented by an etiquette of braided laces with tassels and a white plume of horsehair. The leather chin strap had flat metal scales.
The armament of the hussars consisted of a light cavalry saber and a pair of pistols; The 16 best shooters of each squadron had rifled cavalry carbines, and non-commissioned officers were armed with blunderbusses, the trunks of which had a bell (an analogue of French trombones). The 30 men of the front row in each squadron were armed with pikes.


An officer of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment in dress uniform and a non-commissioned officer of the Izyum Infantry Regiment in summer uniform

Private pikeman of the Pavlograd Hussar Regiment in winter marching uniform and private of the Elisavetgrad Hussar Regiment in winter marching uniform with a raincoat

Light Cavalry - Lancers

Lancer units in Russia were modeled after the Polish uhlan troops; they wore the Polish uniform, as did the uhlans of all other armies. However, unlike the French army, where the lancers were considered line cavalry, the Russian lancers were light cavalry and performed the same tasks as the hussars.
The lance was considered the main weapon of the lancer, but it was supplemented by a saber and a pair of pistols. In addition, 16 lancers in the squadron (the so-called flankers) had short rifled fittings.
By the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, there were 5 army uhlan regiments in Russia:
Volyn Lancers Regiment
Lithuanian Lancers Regiment
Polish Lancers Regiment
Tatar Lancers Regiment
Chuguevsky Lancers Regiment
During the war, the lancers proved themselves in the best possible way, and the number of lancers units in December 1812 was increased by 7 regiments due to the reorganization of dragoon units into lancers.
The uniform of the Russian lancers, as already mentioned, was an imitation of the uniform of the Polish lancers. It consisted of a blue cloth jacket with coattails and colored lapels, decorated with white cloth epaulettes, and long blue breeches with colored stripes. The lancer's head was crowned with a Polish-style hat with a square top and a white sultan.


Privates of the Polish Lancers in full dress and marching uniform

Irregular cavalry - COSSACKS and NATIONAL FORMATIONS

The Cossacks played a huge role in the war of 1812. They were irregular troops, i.e. troops that do not have a permanent organization and differ from regular military formations in recruitment, service, training and uniforms.
The Cossacks were a special military class, consisting of the population of certain territories of Russia; troops were formed on these territories: Don, Ural, Orenburg, Ukrainian and others. The Cossacks enjoyed special rights and privileges for the fact that in the event of war, the entire combat-ready male population went to war (the listed rights and obligations extended, except for the Cossacks, to the Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Meshcheryaks, Crimean Tatars and some other nationalities). Cossack and national troops gathered in five hundred cavalry regiments, which uniformed themselves, equipped, armed and provided horses. This determined the huge disparity in the weapons and appearance of the irregular troops.
Irregular regiments, as highly maneuverable units, were attached to armies and separate corps, used for ambushes, surprise attacks, raids on the rear and envelopment of enemy flanks. Many Cossack regiments were part of the flying army partisan detachments that violated enemy communications and smashed the rear of the enemy.

For many years, the First Cavalry Army was the sacred military cow of the Soviet regime. In the mind of an ordinary citizen of the USSR, the First Cavalry - this was the Red Army of the times civil war, that invincible force that defended the Workers 'and Peasants' Republic from the invasion of 14 powers, Denikin, Kolchak, Yudenich and Wrangel. In the civil war, 17 field and 2 cavalry armies with a total number of 5 million people acted on the side of the Reds, but the 30,000-strong Cavalry was preserved in the memory of the people. Many books have been written about her, songs were composed in her honor, her heroic struggle has served as the theme of films, plays, paintings and monumental sculpture.

Soldiers of the 1st Cavalry

During the twenties and thirties, the cavalry dominated the leadership of the country's armed forces. The traces of this domination are very visible. For 58 years, from 1918 to 1976, the Soviet state was replaced - under various names - 10 military ministers. Three of them served in the Cavalry, they led the country's defense for 25 years: 1925-1940 K. E. Voroshilov, 1940-1941 S. K. Timoshenko, 1967 – 1976 A. A. Grechko. We must also remember that in the 19-year interval between the end of the civil war and the beginning of the Patriotic War, only 3 years, and even then at the very beginning, there was no cavalryman at the helm of the Red Army.

First Cavalry Army. video film

Staying in the First Cavalry served as a pass to occupy the highest command positions. Such an unprecedented for the 20th century dictatorship of the cavalry in the army of a great power was able to establish itself for the reason that the country was ruled by the godfather of the First Cavalry - Stalin, and the armed forces - by her political mentor Voroshilov. Just as the emperor Caligula brought his horse into the senate, these two horse worshipers flooded the army elite with cavalrymen. Cavalrymen S. M. Budyonny, G. I. Kulik, E. A. Shchadenko, A. A. Grechko, K. S. Moskalenko were deputy ministers (commissar) of defense, K. A. Meretskov - chief of the General Staff. With the introduction of personal military ranks in 1935, two of the first five marshals were horsemen, and the third, Egorov, commanded the front on which the First Cavalry was created. It is worth mentioning that both commanders-in-chief of the civil war did not receive marshal ranks, as well as Yakir and Uborevich. In total, 8 marshals of the Soviet Union (including Georgy Zhukov), 9 army generals and marshals of the military branches, as well as a significant number of other generals, left Budyonny's cavalry.

Before the war, Budenovites played an exceptional role in the Red Army. Naturally, they bear a huge share of responsibility for the catastrophe of 1937-1938. and the defeat of the first years of the war. Only with the start of hostilities was the complete military failure of Voroshilov, Budyonny, Timoshenko, Shchadenko, Tyulenev, Apanasenko and Kulik revealed. The latter was demoted twice for shameful behavior at the front and turned from a marshal into a major; Still, Stalin did not let one of his chief advisers of the pre-war years completely slip away, and Kulik was allowed to die as a major general. In the mid-sixties, the marshal's baton was returned to him posthumously.

All this makes us take a closer look at the First Cavalry. We do not set ourselves the goal of covering its history in full. We will only try to restore the truth about some facts and episodes.

Creation of the First Cavalry

In Soviet literature, it is considered indisputable that the First Cavalry represents the first strategic cavalry unit in the modern history of wars. The matter is not so simple. Indeed, horse armies did not exist before. At the same time, the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bcreating a strategic cavalry, performing independent decisive tasks in the rear of the enemy, in isolation from the main forces, belongs to Anton Ivanovich Denikin. He not only put forward this bold idea, but also formed in August 1919 an association of cavalry from two corps. In the future, to this group under the command of General Mamontova horse corps was attached Shkuro. Thus, Denikin had at his disposal a strategic cavalry group, equal in strength to the army. Mamontov's group carried out a breakthrough of the Southern Front of the Reds and within a month successfully operated in their rear, capturing Tambov, Kozlov, Voronezh. The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops was thwarted. Moreover, Mamontov's actions allowed the general's army May-Maevsky move far north. After the Whites captured Kursk and Orel, a direct threat arose to Tula with its weapons factories and to Moscow itself.

In the third volume of the Soviet “History of the Civil War” (1930) we read: “The significance of the actions of large cavalry masses in the conditions of the civil war was correctly taken into account by the red command from the example of the Mamontov raid. This raid finally formalized the decision to create large cavalry masses of the red cavalry ... ”(p. 261). This evidence of Denikin's priority is all the more valuable because it belongs to the top leaders of the Red Army of that time - the editors of the volume were S. S. Kamenev, Bubnov, Tukhachevsky, Eideman. In the future, Soviet historians tried to completely forget this recognition.

Dumenko and Budyonny

The second important and utterly confusing question: what was the First Cavalry born from? For a long time we were informed that it arose on the basis of the Budyonny corps, which grew out of Budyonny's 4th cavalry division. In the 1960s, through the efforts of relatively honest historians (T. A. Illeritskaya, V. D. Polikarpov), the veil of lies was temporarily lifted. This caused an exceptionally sharp reaction in the camp of the Budenovites, and further research was stopped.

What caused the stormy anger of the elderly, but people who did not lose their influence? For example, the head of the Academy Frunze, Army General A. T. Stuchenko even girded himself with a saber and in this form appeared at the editorial office of Nedelya, which published Polikarpov's essay. They were outraged, even offended by the attempt to restore the true circumstances of the death of one of the participants in the civil war - B. M. Dumenko, which in 1918 formed a cavalry detachment from the rebels of Salsky and other districts. In July, the First Cavalry Peasant Socialist Punitive Regiment was formed on its basis. He commanded the regiment Dumenko, after a while Budyonny became his assistant. In the future, this unit grew into the very 4th Petrograd Cavalry Division, from which the First Cavalry originated. Dumenko commanded the division until May 1919 and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. But then a severe wound puts Dumenko out of action until the autumn. During his treatment, the First Concorps was created as part of the 4th and 6th divisions. Instead of the wounded Dumenko, Budyonny was appointed to command them. On November 17, Budyonny's corps, enlarged by the addition of other units, was renamed the 1st Cavalry Army. Dumenko, on his recovery, received a new appointment - the commander of the emerging Horse-Consolidated Corps. In January 1920, it was he who defeated Denikin's cavalry near Novocherkassk, which made it easier for the First Cavalry and the 8th Army to capture Rostov-on-Don.

Boris Dumenko

However, in February 1920, two Budenovites - Chief Division S. K. Timoshenko, temporarily removed for drunkenness, and B. S. Gorbachev, commander of the Special Cavalry Brigade (cavalry Cheka) - fraudulently arrested Dumenko. He was taken to the headquarters of the First Cavalry, at the origins of which he himself stood, and from there to Rostov. There he was tried by a tribunal on a formal charge of organizing the murder of a commissioner V. Mikeladze sent to him in the Equestrian Composite Corps. The latter died under unclear circumstances. The tribunal did not have any evidence, however, on May 11, 1920, Dumenko, a hero of the Red Army, whose merits far overshadowed the glory of Budyonny, was shot. More than forty years later, Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR Blinov, who studied the materials of this case, was forced to state: “If this is the law, then what is blatant lawlessness ?!” There were rumors that the true cause of Dumenko's death was his "anti-Semitism". Soviet newspapers, reporting on the verdict, wrote to him:

Komkor Dumenko, Chief of Staff Abramov, Chief of Intelligence Kolpakov, Chief of Operations Blekhert... pursued a systematic anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet policy, scolding the central Soviet government and calling the responsible leaders of the Red Army Jews in the form of insulting abuse, did not recognize political commissars, in every possible way hindering political work in the corps ... To deprive the awards received from the Soviet government, including the Order of the Red Banner, the honorary title of Red Commanders and apply capital punishment to them - to shoot them ... The verdict is final and not subject to appeal.

The name of commander Dumenko was deleted from the history of the Red Army, Budyonny attributed his merits to himself. In 1920, Dumenko seriously competed with Budyonny in his claims to be the first red cavalryman. There is reason to believe that Budyonny, together with Voroshilov, had a hand in eliminating the commander. This assumption is supported not only by the circumstances of Dumenko's arrest, but also by the presence of the cavalry soldier E. A. Shchadenko in the tribunal, and the later long-term malice about Dumenko, and the behavior of Budyonny in relation to his other rival - Philip Mironov. It is also worth noting that the command of the First Cavalry repeatedly raised the question of subordinating Dumenko's corps to him.

Semyon Budyonny

The role of the First Cavalry in the defeat of Denikin

After Uborevich's group struck Volunteer army Denikin defeat at Orel, Budyonny's cavalry became a trump card in the hands of the red command. In October 1919, Budyonny's contingent, reinforced by a cavalry division and a rifle brigade, Voronezh-Kastornensky operation dealt a death blow to the white strategic cavalry. In essence, under the leadership of Budyonny there was already a cavalry army, the creation of which was formally fixed in November. The result was expressed not only in the defeat of the Mamontov group, from which it never recovered, but also in a colossal moral impact: now Denikin's rear was under constant threat.

The White Front has collapsed. The Soviet command quickly developed success. In January 1920, the First Cavalry captured Rostov with a lightning strike. The success of the cavalry was secured by the 8th army. The retreating Denikin troops created a line of defense along the left bank of the Don with a key point in Bataysk. The idea of ​​​​the command of the Caucasian Front (V.I. Shorin), at the disposal of which the First Cavalry came at its disposal, was to bypass or capture Bataysk to prevent the main White forces from retreating to Novorossiysk. Thus, Denikin was deprived of the opportunity to cross to the Crimean peninsula and form a new front there.

Denikin really hoped, if he failed to gain a foothold behind the Don, to withdraw to the Crimea through Novorossiysk. However, the breakthrough of the white front on the move by the red failed. The First Cavalry and the 8th Army made several attempts to take Bataysk, but they were all unsuccessful. There was a dangerous delay in the offensive of the Red Army, which in the end took advantage of Denikin. Shorin's plan was thwarted. 40 thousand whites crossed to the Crimea.

The “Bataysk cork” gave rise to extremely sharp disagreements in the camp of the Reds. Shorin accused Budyonny and the commander of the 8th G. Ya. Sokolnikov in the absence of active actions. Budyonny complained about "completely unsuitable for cavalry operations," Sokolnikov reproached the Cavalry for showing "extremely low combat stability." Without going into the essence of the dispute, we note that near Bataysk, for the first time, the inability of the strategic cavalry to overcome the dense prepared defense was revealed. Undoubtedly, the unfavorable conditions of the area played a role: a water barrier (Don) and swampiness of the left bank. But the psychological factor cannot be ruled out. It was extremely difficult for Voroshilov and Budyonny to lead their horsemen out of warm and rich Rostov in the dead of winter.

In the spring of 1920, the First Cavalry was transferred from the Caucasus to the front of the just-begun Soviet-Polish war. On May 18, she appears near Elizavetgrad. By this time, the Poles, who had captured Kyiv, went over to the defensive along the entire front. The commissioning of the Cavalry creates a turning point in favor of the Soviet troops. On June 5, she broke through the enemy front near the village of Ozernaya and with all four divisions went to the Polish rear. It was a major operational success and the culmination of the battle path of the First Cavalry. The threat of complete encirclement and destruction loomed over the 3rd Polish Army of General Rydz-Smigly. But the operation "Kyiv Cannes" was not destined to be realized. The groups of Yakir and Golikov were late in completing their tasks. The First Cavalry, in violation of the order, did not hit the rear of Rydz-Smigly, bypassed the fortified Kazatin and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir with rich warehouses. The major success of the Southwestern Front was incomplete. The Poles lost all the territory occupied in Ukraine, but managed to save manpower.

During the Soviet offensive S. S. Kamenev developed a plan for the further conduct of the campaign, which received the approval of the Politburo. It was planned that after all the Red forces reached the Brest-Southern Bug line, the management of the South-Western Front (commander Egorov, members of the Revolutionary Military Council Stalin, Berzin) would transfer the First Cavalry, 12th and 14th armies to the command of Tukhachevsky, and itself turn against Wrangel, who had advanced at that time in Northern Tavria. But Stalin did not smile at all at the prospect of refusing to participate in the close, as it seemed, capture of all of Poland. Tukhachevsky subsequently wrote that "the existence of the capitalist world, not only Poland, but all of Europe, was at stake." The furious revolutionary Stalin wanted to personally attack world capitalism.

By mid-July 1920, Tukhachevsky's troops, having overturned the front of General Sheptytsky opposing them, occupied Bobruisk, Minsk, Vilna and broke into Poland. The position of the Poles became desperate. There was a threat to Warsaw and the youngest Polish state. Western diplomacy rushed to Pilsudski's aid. July 12 followed Curzon's note. The British Foreign Minister demanded an end to hostilities and the establishment between Poland and Soviet Russia of the so-called. ethnographic border along " Curzon lines”, approximately corresponding to the current one. The ultimatum was rejected, but after a direct appeal from the Poles, negotiations began in Borisov. Meanwhile, the offensive of the Reds continued on both fronts.

In early August, the commander-in-chief decides on a concentric strike of all forces on Warsaw. In this regard, he orders the transfer to the Western Front (Tukhachevsky), first of the 12th and First Cavalry Armies, and then of the 14th Army. At this moment the ruler of Poland Y. Pilsudsky assesses his situation as catastrophic. He believes that the Polish troops are not able to hold back the offensive from the east and south and asks the commandant of the Lvov fortified area to divert at least three divisions of the Reds.

Unexpectedly, Pilsudski had hope for salvation, because the command of the Southwestern Front threw the very armies that were intended to attack Warsaw to storm Lvov. Thus, the initial plan of the Reds was thwarted, and the enemy received an unforeseen opportunity to organize a retaliatory offensive. Partial blame lies with Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, who was not persistent enough in carrying out his own directive, in addition, at the last second, he was frightened by the imaginary Romanian danger. But the main responsibility lies with Stalin, who really wanted a resounding success in the form of the capture of Lvov. Amorphous Yegorov could not resist the pressure of the future leader. Meanwhile, the well-fortified Lviv was too tough for the First Cavalry and 12th Army. Lenin categorically objected to the blow of the "spread five" and insisted on the capture of Warsaw. Stalin stood his ground. A fruitless exchange of telegrams continued for 10 days. Finally, under pressure from Lenin, on August 13, the commander-in-chief categorically demanded that the directive on the transfer of three armies to Tukhachevsky be carried out. Stalin remained true to himself and did not sign the order prepared by Yegorov on the front. It should be remembered that in those years the order of the commander had no legal force without the signature of one of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council. Until that time, Stalin, as the first member of the Revolutionary Military Council, sealed all the operational orders of the commander. Another political commissar of the front, R. I. Berzin, was aloof from purely military affairs. On this basis, at first he also did not want to put his signature and did so only after Trotsky's direct instructions.

Stalin's self-will interrupted his military career for 20 years. He sent a resignation telegram to Moscow, in the expectation that his plan of action would be adopted. However, the plenum of the Central Committee that took place in those days removed Stalin from the front and generally removed him from military work. He also did not get into the next composition of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Only after the described telegraph battles did the First Cavalry switch to the Warsaw direction. However, time has been lost. The situation has changed dramatically. The Poles took advantage of the respite and launched a counteroffensive. The Polish command struck a blow at the weak Mozyr grouping of the Reds in the gap between the fronts and achieved a turning point in the course of the campaign. Now a certain numerical superiority of the Poles and the better equipment of their army were supplemented by a solid operational advantage. The war also stirred up the national-patriotic feelings of the Polish people. The calculation of the Russian Bolsheviks and their Polish associates ( Dzerzhinsky, Markhlevsky, Unshlikht) to support the proletariat of Poland turned out to be a fiction.

The Red Army troops on both fronts rolled back, losing the western part of Ukraine and Belarus to the Poles. The first Cavalry, advanced to Zamość, barely escaped destruction. Riga world, who ended the Soviet-Polish war in March 1921, established the border much east of the Curzon Line.

Tukhachevsky, who was deprived of the opportunity to successfully complete the operation by Stalin's selfish calculations, never looked for specific culprits for the defeat (see his book The Campaign for the Vistula). Stalin and the Stalinists were not so delicate. Even before the arrest, Tukhachevsky was accused of mistakes on the Polish front. After the death of the marshal (see the article “ The trial of the military”), the standard wording entered all textbooks and military writings: the traitors Trotsky and Tukhachevsky thwarted the capture of Lvov and Warsaw.

The lessons of the Polish campaign allow a sober assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the First Cavalry, as well as the strategic cavalry in general. Large masses of cavalry were effective in breakthroughs, raids behind enemy lines and raids. The Civil War differed from the previous World War in the absence of a continuous front line and a low density of fire. There were 135-180 rifles per verst of the front, which was even lower than the corresponding indicator for outposts in the world war. The number of cannons and machine guns was negligible. Under these conditions, the breakthrough of the front, which, by the way, had a huge length, was greatly facilitated. Due to the lack of an echeloned defense, movement behind enemy lines was almost unimpeded, which ensured the complete surprise of the attack on the concentration of troops. But in the case of overcoming the prepared defense, the cavalry lost its advantages: it suffered heavy losses and did not achieve success. So it was at Bataysk, this was also discovered by repeated fruitless attempts to seize Lvov. The cavalry itself was ill-equipped to conduct defensive battles. Here she needed solid infantry support. But after all, the strength of the cavalry just consisted in its ability to solve major problems, regardless of the main forces. A contradiction arose that seemed unresolvable. It turned out that large horse masses were needed only for a short period of the civil war, suitable only for its specific conditions. Armed with dialectics, Marxist military thought in the person of Voroshilov, Budyonny and Yegorov coped with this antinomy. They announced that all wars from now on will be exclusively maneuverable, and the Red Army will only advance, which means that it cannot do without a powerful cavalry ...

In all types of hostilities, the First Cavalry was easily vulnerable from the air. Air raids brought her heavy losses near Lvov and later in the fight against Wrangel. “Bombing from airplanes flying in groups over horse masses is not paralyzed by anything on our part,” Voroshilov complained to Frunze in November 1920.

First Cavalry on the Wrangel Front

But even earlier, on the way to the Wrangel front, the Cavalry had to go through the most difficult trials. Having just known the bitterness of defeat, the rather battered First Cavalry began decay . However, the motley personnel of the Budenov army had never sinned before with an addiction to military discipline. The Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry had difficulty restraining the passions of this freemen. Because of the need to engage in self-supply, acute excesses arose every now and then in relations with the civilian population. On this occasion, the army command had to justify itself more than once to the high authorities - up to Lenin and Trotsky. Back in Rostov, Voroshilov gave the commandant of the city for organizing a Jewish pogrom A. Ya. Parkhomenko under the tribunal, which sentenced him to death. Only the intervention of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze saved the life of the legendary commander.

What happened during the transfer of the First Cavalry from the Polish front was much more serious. The morals of the horsemen, truthfully described Babel, horrified many readers. But these descriptions date back to the era of the war with Poland. Babel did not see the Cavalry on the way to the Crimea, when, according to Voroshilov, its "dark days" came. Unbridled robberies of the civilian population began. When trying to stop them, the commissar of the 6th Cavalry Division Shepelev was killed. Voroshilov reacted decisively. According to his biographer Orlovsky, former secretary of the Cavalry Revolutionary Military Council, Voroshilov realized that this outbreak of "partisanism" could destroy the army. The division was put on trial (an unprecedented case in the Red Army) and disbanded. Under the muzzles of special officers, the division fighters, laying down their banners and weapons, began to point out the marauders. There were 150 of them. 101 of them were shot. The personnel of the division were given the opportunity to wash away this shame with blood.

The First Cavalry moved slowly to the Wrangel front and arrived there very weakened. Moreover, Voroshilov and Budyonny sought a special status for themselves and wanted to fight according to their own plan. For these reasons, Frunze used the First Cavalry under the curtain Crimean operation when the victorious outcome was no longer in doubt.

The last major outbreak of "partisanism" occurred in 1921 in the North Caucasus. Impressed by grain requisitions, Maslakov's brigade, headed by a brigade commander, broke away from the First Cavalry and turned into an anti-Soviet partisan detachment. In parallel with this, self-supply continued with the inevitable robberies. The tribunals took over. A significant part of the Cavalry went under execution. In May 1921 the First Cavalry was disbanded.

Later, I. S. Kutyakov, who commanded the 25th "Chapaevskaya" rifle division on the Polish front, in collaboration with N. M. Khlebnikov, wrote the book "Kyiv Cannes". It showed how the Third Army of the Poles managed to avoid encirclement and defeat. In 1937, Kutyakov handed over the manuscript to People's Commissar Voroshilov, after which he was arrested and died.

This had to be recognized by Stalin (“On the Question of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists”). Despite this, until the Patriotic War itself, the thesis about the support of the Red Army by the proletariat of the countries at war with the USSR was an integral part of the Soviet military doctrine and was deeply rooted in the public consciousness.

One should not think that if there had not been a hitch with the First Cavalry, Warsaw would certainly have been taken, and Poland would have been defeated. Our description applies only to operational environment. When analyzing from a higher point, one has to take into account that behind Poland was the military and especially the economic power of the entire Entente. Lenin openly called the failure of the Polish campaign a miscalculation in politics . Regarding the purely military side of the matter, he once remarked in a conversation: “Well, who goes to Warsaw through Lvov ...”